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Note
The ADA's Abrogation of Eleventh Amendment State
Immunity as a Valid Exercise of Congress's Power to
Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment
Elizabeth Welter*
In 1996, the Supreme Court took the legal community by
surprise in a sharply divided opinion addressing the extent of
Congress's power to infringe on states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity. Seminole Tribe v. Florida' held that Congress lacks
the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity under its
power to regulate interstate commerce.2 The decision reversed
an earlier case holding that the Commerce Clause granted such
power? Given the centrality of the Commerce Clause to Con-
gress's expanding legislative reach,4 the inability to abrogate
state immunity under it is a serious limitation on federal legis-
lative authority.
By ensuring state immunity from suit in federal court, the
Eleventh Amendment limits Congress's ability to regulate state
conduct.5 Other than the Commerce Clause, the only acknowl-
edged source of power enabling Congress to overcome Eleventh
* J.D. Candidate 1999, University of Minnesota Law School; B-. 1993,
University of Minnesota.
1. 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996) (5-4 decision).
2. See infra text accompanying note 36 (describing Seminole Tribe).
3. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1989) (plurality
opinion).
4. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971) (explaining that
the Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to regulate the channels and
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, people, and articles moving in in-
terstate commerce, and activities affecting commerce); Vincent A. Cirillo &
Jay W. Eisenhofer, Reflections on the Congressional Commerce Power, 60
TEMP. L.Q. 901, 912 (1987) (describing the expansion of Congress's power un-
der the Commerce Clause). But see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 5 .9, 559(1995) (explaining that Congress cannot regulate intrastate activities under
the Commerce Clause unless they "substantially affectp interstate commerce).
5. See infra Part I.A (explaining Eleventh Amendment immunity).
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Amendment immunity is section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, which grants Congress the authority to enforce the Four-
teenth Amendment's provisions.' After Seminole Tribe, the
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power stands as Con-
gress's sole recognized authority to abrogate state immunity.
Determining the extent of this authority is therefore essential.
Just a year after Seminole Tribe unexpectedly highlighted the
importance of the enforcement power, the Supreme Court issued
a significant decision involving the limits of this power. In City
of Boerne v. Flores,7 the Court struck down the federal Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),8 which had restricted the
application of state laws that burden the exercise of religion as
an illegitimate use of Congress's Fourteenth Amendment
authority. Prior to Flores, the Fourteenth Amendment en-
forcement power was considered quite broad." Some scholars
even asserted that it gave Congress the ability to define, and
possibly expand, the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2 While Flores pointedly put an end to this specu-
lation, 3 the effect it has on Congress's power to enact laws under
the Fourteenth Amendment has yet to be determined. Already,
under Seminole Tribe, courts have held a number of federal laws
unenforceable against states, including the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 4 the Equal Pay Act," and the Age Discrimination in Employ-
6. See infra text accompanying note 38 (quoting the Fourteenth
Amendment). In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, the Supreme Court held that Congress
could abrogate state immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment. See 427
U.S. 445,456(1976). It did not reach the question whether Title VII is a valid
exercise of Congress's power to enforce the Amendment, however. See id at
456 nll ("Apart from their claim that the Eleventh Amendment bars en-
forcement of the remedy established by Title VII in this case, respondent state
officials do not contend that the substantive provisions of Title VII as applied
here are not a proper exercise of congressional authority under section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment."). While other constitutional provisions may en-
able Congress to abrogate state immunity, prior to Seminole Tribe the Su-
preme Court had only expressly recognized this power in the Commerce
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.
7. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
8. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994)).
9. Id. § 2000bb-1.
10. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2171.
11. See infra Part I.B.3 (describing the enforcement power).
12. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
13. Mores, 117 S. Ct. at 2167.
14. See Mills v. Maine, 118 F.3d 37,48 (1st Cir. 1997).
15. See Larry v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala., 975 F. Supp. 1447,
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ment Act.6 Now that Flores has articulated a new standard for
measuring the boundaries of the Fourteenth Amendment power,
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),'7 a comprehensive
federal law directed at eliminating discrimination against dis-
abled individuals, is particularly vulnerable under Seminole
Tribe.
While the ADA's application to private actors is not in
doubt," lower courts have begun to split over whether it can be
enforced against states. 9 As the Commerce Clause no longer
enables Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity, the en-
forceability of the ADA against states turns on its validity as an
exercise of Congress's Fourteenth Amendment power. Because
the ADA protects disabled individuals, a group that the Supreme
Court has indicated does not warrant heightened judicial scru-
tiny under the Fourteenth Amendment,2 courts disagree over
the threshold issue of whether Congress has the authority to
create any protection for disabled individuals under the Four-
teenth Amendment.2' Even where courts agree that Congress
1450 (N.D. Ala. 1997).
16. See MacPherson v. University of Montevallo, 938 F. Supp. 785, 789
(N.D. Ala. 1996).
17. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 328 (1990) (codified primarily at 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994)).
18. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580, 593 (D. Me. 1995) (holding
Title III valid under the Commerce Clause as applied to a dentist); United
States v. Morvant, 898 F. Supp. 1157, 1167 (E.D. La. 1995) (same); Pinnock v.
International House of Pancakes Franchisee, 844 F. Supp. 574, 579 (S.D. Cal.
1993) (holding that Title HI of the ADA, which regulates public accommoda-
tions, is a proper exercise of the Commerce Clause power as applied to a res-
taurant).
19. See Nihiser v. Ohio Envtl. Protection Agency, 979 F. Supp. 1168, 1176
(S.D. Ohio 1997) (holding that the ADA's reasonable accommodation require-
ment is not valid under the Fourteenth Amendment); Garrett v. Board of
Trustees of the Univ. of Ala., Nos. CivA. 97-AR-0092, CivA_ 97-AR-2179-S.,
1998 WL 21879, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 13, 1998) (agreeing with the court in Ni-
hiser); Brown v. North Carolina Div. of Motor Vehicles, No. 5:96-CV-689-
BO(1), 1997 WL 755010, at *10 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 28, 1997) (holding that the
ADA as a whole is not valid under the Fourteenth Amendment). But see
Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 1997), petition for cert. filed,
66 U.S.L.W. 3308 (U.S. Oct. 20, 1997) (No. 97-686) (holding that the ADA is
valid under the Fourteenth Amendment); Autio v. Minnesota, 968 F. Supp.
1366, 1372 (D. Minn. 1997) (same); Martin v. Kansas, 978 F. Supp. 992, 996
(D. Kan. 1997) (same).
20. See infra Part I.B.2 (discussing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), in which the Supreme Court held that mental
disability is not a suspect class).
21. Compare Brown, 1997 WL 755010, at *7 (explaining that Congress
may not use its Fourteenth Amendment power to protect disabled individuals)
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has such an ability, they split over whether the ADA's accommo-
dation requirement may properly apply to states.'
This Note examines whether the ADA is a valid exercise of
Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, thus
enabling it to be enforceable against states. Part I surveys the
development of Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendment jurispru-
dence. Part II provides an overview of the extent of discrimina-
tion against disabled individuals and Congress's attempt to
remedy this discrimination in the form of the ADA. Part III
analyzes the objections to Congress's use of its Fourteenth
Amendment power to enact the ADA. This Note concludes that
the ADA is a valid method for Congress to enforce the Four-
teenth Amendment and as such is properly enforceable against
states.
I. CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO ABROGATE STATE
EMMUNITY
A. STATE SOVEREIGNTY UNDER THE ELEVENTH AmENDMENT
The Eleventh Amendment prohibits "Citizens of another
State, or... Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State" from suing
a state in federal court.' Although the language of the Amend-
ment itself does not bar suits against a state by its own citizens, 4
the Supreme Court has long held that such suits are prohibitede
This immunity from suit extends to state agents and instrumen-
with Martin, 978 F. Supp. at 995 (holding that protecting disabled individuals
is a legitimate use of Congress's enforcement power).
22. Compare Autio, 968 F. Supp. at 1370 (holding the accommodation re-
quirement valid) with Nihiser, 979 F. Supp. at 1174 ("[11n enacting the ac-
commodation provisions, Congress created a substantive right to preferential
treatment where no such right previously existed under the Equal Protection
Clause.").
23. The fuill text of the Amendment provides that "[tihe Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of an-
other State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST.
amend. XI.
24. The amendment refers only to citizens of other states and foreign citi-
zens. See id.
25. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890). Similarly, although the
Eleventh Amendment refers only to suits in law and equity, the Court has
also held that the Amendment bars suits in admiralty. See Ex parte New
York, No. 1, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) (barring in personam suit in admiralty);
Ex parte New York, No. 2, 256 U.S. 503, 511 (1921) (barring in rem suit
against vessel owned by the state).
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talitiesO There are a number of limitations on Eleventh
Amendment immunity, however. The Eleventh Amendment
does not apply to political subdivisions of a state,27 and it does
not bar suits brought by the United States' or another state.9 It
does not preclude suits seeking only to enjoin a state officer from
engaging in conduct that is illegal under federal law or the fed-
eral Constitution.30 States may also waive their immunity.3 Fi-
nally, Congress has limited power to abrogate it.32
Before Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court had held that Con-
gress could abrogate state immunity pursuant to its Commerce
Clause power" as well as its power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment,' so long as Congress made its intent to abrogate
"unmistakable."5 In Seminole Tribe, the Court held that Con-
gress may not abrogate state immunity under any of its Article I
powers, including the Commerce Clause.36 Thus, after Seminole
26. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 117 S. Ct. 900, 903-04 (1997).
The immunity applies "when the action is in essence one for the recovery of
money from the state, [in which case] the state is the real, substantial party
in interest... even though individual officials are nominal defendants." Ford
Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459,464 (1945).
27. See Mount Healthy Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,281
(1977); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890).
28. See United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 14041 (1965).
29. See Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 182 n.9 (1982).
30. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159 (1908). The doctrine of Ex
parte Young may ultimately enable many plaintiffs to sue states under the
ADA. See Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 1997) (allowing
an ADA claim to go forward under Ex parte Young). A consideration of this
doctrine, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
31. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2033 (1997)
(explaining states' ability to consent to suit).
32. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
33. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, l. 3 (granting Congress the power to
"regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States"); see
also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1989) (plurality opin-
ion).
34. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456. Congress has the power to enforce
the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment "by appropriate legislation."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
35. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985). The
ADA includes a clause expressly abrogating state immunity. See 42 U.S.C. §
12202 (1994). As a result, courts have had no difficulty recognizing that Con-
gress met the requirement of "unmistakable" intent to abrogate immunity in
the ADA. See Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267, 1269-70 (1997); Autio v.
Minnesota, 968 F. Supp. 1366, 1368 (D. Minn. 1997).
36. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1128 (1996). Seminole
Tribe involved legislation passed pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. In holding that Congress may not abrogate state
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Tribe, the Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power is the sole
recognized source of congressional authority to abrogate state
immunity. 37
B. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
1. The Meaning of 'Equal Protection"
The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that
no state may "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."38 The Equal Protection Clause "is
essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should
be treated alike."39 In other words, the clause limits the ability of
legislatures to classify individuals into groups for the purpose of
subjecting them to dissimilar treatment under the law. In
analyzing equal protection claims, courts focus on the govern-
ment's intent' Government action that unintentionally harms
one group more than another does not violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.42
immunity under this clause, the Court distinguished the Fourteenth Amend-
ment power on the basis that the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted after
the Eleventh Amendment. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1128.
37. See Nihiser v. Ohio EnvtL Protection Agency, 979 F. Supp. 1168, 1170(S.D. Ohio 1997) (Tihe only currently recognized authority for Congress to
abrogate the states' sovereign immunity... consists of Congress' enactment
of legislation pursuant to its enforcement powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
38. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The original purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to abolish the official practice of racial discrimination. See
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
39. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439(1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,216 (1982)).
40. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrTIIONAL LAW § 16-2, at
1439 n.22 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that legislative classifications are the focus of
equal protection).
4L See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) ("[Olur cases have
not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to
whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely
because it has a racially disproportionate impact.").
42. See id. at 245 (rejecting an equal protection challenge to a qualifica-
tion test for police officers that had a racially disproportionate impact). Al-
though the Fourteenth Amendment provides no remedy for "disparate impact"
employment discrimination, Congress has created such a remedy in Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994). Title VII forbids
discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and
national origin. See id. § 2000e-2. Prohibited discrimination includes the use
of tests or other qualifiers for employment that have a disparate impact along
protected class lines, even where intent to discriminate does not exist. See i&d§ 2000e-2(a)(2), (k)(1)(A)-(B); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431
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Because legislation almost always distinguishes between
groups of people,43 courts have developed a set of standards to
examine the validity of legislative classifications." Only those
classifications considered inherently suspect45 or quasi-suspect
receive heightened judicial scrutiny.47 All other classifications are
considered presumptively valid." To determine whether to treat
a classification as suspect, courts examine a number of factors,
including whether the disadvantaged group has historically been
subject to intentional discrimination,49 whether the group is par-
(1971) ("[Title VII] proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices
that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.). If the employer can
establish that the test is related to job performance, however, it is permissi-
ble. See id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)i); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
43. See TRIBE, supra note 40, § 16-2, at 1439 n.22.
44. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439-40 (explaining that "absent controlling
congressional direction, the courts have themselves devised standards for de-
termining the validity of state legislation").
45. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (noting that
racial classifications are "'constitutionally suspect' and subject to the 'most
rigid scrutiny") (citations omitted).
46. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724
(1982) ("Our decisions... establish that the party seeking to uphold a statute
that classifies individuals on the basis of their gender must carry the burden
of showing an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for the classification.")
(citation omitted).
47. Laws making use of suspect classifications must be narrowly tailored
to meet a compelling government interest. See McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 192.
Laws based on quasi-suspect classifications must reasonably tailored to fit an
important government interest. See Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at
724.
48. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. Laws based on non-suspect classifica-
tions need only be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. See,
e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). Because this ra-
tional basis standard presumes the validity of legislation, the state need not
support its classification in the record. See Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S.
176, 196 (1983). Nor will courts inquire whether the legislation is the best
possible solution to the problem. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma,
Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). This deference stems from the fact that "courts
have been very reluctant, as they should be in our federal system and with
our respect for the separation of powers, to closely scrutinize legislative
choices as to whether, how, and to what extent [legitimate] interests should
be pursued." Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441-42.
49. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313
(1976) ("[A] suspect class is one 'saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to
such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position
of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process.'") (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1972)).
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ticularly politically powerless,"0 and whether the characteristics
that set the group apart are immutable."
2. Disability as a Non-Suspect Classification
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,' the Su-
preme Court addressed whether mental disability is a suspect or
quasi-suspect classification. 3 Cleburne involved a city zoning
ordinance that required a special use permit to operate a group
home for mentally retarded persons.' The plaintiffs challenged
the city's denial of their request for a permit on equal protection
grounds.5 Although the Court held that mental disability is not
a suspect classification,' it found the denial of the permit viola-
tive of the Fourteenth Amendment using a rational basis stan-
dard. In its analysis, the Court mentioned a series of groups
that it also apparently believed did not trigger heightened scru-
tiny, including the physically disabled. 8 As a result, commenta-
50. See id.
5L See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opin-
ion) ("[S]ince sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic
determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disabilities
upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex would seem to vio-
late 'the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some re-
lationship to individual responsibility.') (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)); cf. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement, 427
U.S. at 313-14 ("[O]ld age does not define a 'discrete and insular'
group... [because] it marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out
our normal span.") (citations omitted). The phrase "discrete and insular"
originated in a famous footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("Nor need we enquire whether ... prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seri-
ously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied
upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry.").
52. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
53. See id. at 435.
54. See id.
55. See id. at 437.
56. See id. at 442.
57. See id. at 435. In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part, Justice Marshall argued that the majority reached this result using a
higher level of scrutiny than it acknowledged. See id. at 456 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Later commentators have agreed
with Justice Marshall's analysis. See TRIB, supra note 40, § 16-3, at 1444;
Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny
by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 793-96 (1987) (discussing the height-
ened level of scrutiny in Cleburne).
58. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445-46.
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tors have understood Cleburne to establish that disability in
general is not a suspect classification.s9
3. The Enforcement Power
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress
the right to enforce the Amendment "by appropriate legisla-
tion."" The leading case defining Congress's enforcement power
is Katzenbach v. Morgan," which upheld Congress's exercise of
its enforcement power to curtail states' use of English literacy
requirements to deny the right to vote.62 Several years earlier,
the Court had held that such requirements did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause." The Court explained this apparently
anomalous result by describing section 5 as a "positive grant of
legislative power" that allows Congress to determine independ-
ently what legislative action is necessary to enforce the Four-
teenth Amendment." In response to the dissents assertion that
this interpretive power would allow Congress to weaken the
guarantee of equal protection,6s the Court explained in a famous
footnote" that Congress may only act to enforce, not dilute, the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.67 This explanation
gave rise to the "ratchet theory"" that, while Congress may not
59. See Robert E. Rains, A Pre-History of the Americans with Disabilities
Act and Some Initial Thoughts as to Its Constitutional Implications, 11 ST.
Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 185, 199 (1992) (asserting that Cleburne "managed to
weaken future equal protection claims asserted by, not only mentally retarded
persons, but other individuals with disabilities").
60. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
61. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
62. See id. at 646-47.
63. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50-
53 (1959).
64. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966). The Court articu-
lated a standard for analyzing whether legislation is valid under the Four-
teenth Amendment enforcement power: "whether [the law] may be regarded
as an enactment to enforce the Equal Protection Clause, whether it is 'plainly
adapted to that end' and whether it is not prohibited by but is consistent with
'the letter and spirit of the constitution." Id (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. 316,421 (1819)).
65. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
66. See id. at 651 n.10.
67. See id. (explaining that the Fourteenth Amendment "grants Congress
no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute" its guarantees).
68. See William Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and
Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603, 606 (1975) (using the term "ratchet
theory" to describe Justice Brennan's analysis).
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constrict Fourteenth Amendment protections, it may expand
them in the exercise of its enforcement power.69
Commentators had long debated the validity of the ratchet
theory." In City of Boerne v. Flores,71 the Supreme Court's most
recent pronouncement on the enforcement power, the Court
clearly indicated that Congress may not alter the substantive
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.' Flores addressed
the constitutionality of RFRA," which directed courts to apply a
strict scrutiny standard to laws that substantially burden an
individual's exercise of religion.74 Congress enacted RFRA in re-
sponse to the Supreme Courts holding in Employment Division v.
Smith,.5 which upheld a state law criminalizing the use of peyote
for any purpose, including religious ceremonies 6 In Smith, the
Court held that, absent any intent to discriminate on the basis of
religion, state laws of general applicability are valid even when
they interfere with religious practices.'
69. See Rains, supra note 59, at 202 (explaining the ratchet theory).
Some courts and commentators have used this broad interpretation of the en-
forcement power as a basis for asserting that Congress can create its own
suspect classes. See Rains, supra note 59, at 202 (arguing that Congress has
the power to create suspect classes); infra note 105 (citing Martin v. Voi-
novich, 840 F. Supp. 1175 (S.D. Ohio 1993), which held that the ADA over-
ruled Cleburne).
70. Compare Rains, supra note 59, at 202 ("The Court found [in Morgan]
that Congress may, under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, enact laws
to increase equal protection guarantees.") with Jesse H. Choper, Congres-
sional Power to Expand Judicial Definitions of the Substantive Terms of the
Civil War Amendments, 67 MINN. L. REV. 299, 308-09 (1982) ("[Clareful
parsing of [Morgan's abbreviated discussion leads persuasively to the con-
clusion that it probably stands for nothing more than the proposition that
Congress may scrutinize any state regime [such as restrictions on voting]
which the Court has found to be constitutionally questionable.").
71. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
72. See id. at 2167 ("Any suggestion that Congress has a substantive,
non-remedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment is not supported by
our case law."). The Court emphasized this point later at the end of its opin-
ion: "When the political branches of the Government act against the back-
ground of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must
be understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will treat its
precedents with the respect due them under settled principles... and con-
trary expectations must be disappointed." Id. at 2172.
73. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
74. See id. § 2000bb-1.
75. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
76. See id. at 878.
77. See id.
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In Flores, the Court held that RFRA was beyond Congress's
power under the Fourteenth Amendment.7 ' Observing that the
history of the Fourteenth Amendment supports a narrower in-
terpretation of Congress's enforcement power,9 the Court dis-
claimed Morgan's implication that Congress has the power to
expand the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment."0
Instead, the Court explained, the enforcement power is remedial,
and therefore must be limited to preventing or alleviating actual
constitutional violations.81 Noting that the congressional record
cited few instances of purposeful religious discrimination, the
Court concluded that RFRA bore little relation to any constitu-
tional injury.'
Flores reaffirmed the proposition, however, that
[]egislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations
can fall within the sweep of Congress's enforcement power even
if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconsti-
tutional."83 Because "the line between measures that remedy or
78. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157,2172 (1997).
79. See id. at 2164-66 (noting that an earlier draft of the Amendment en-
countered broad opposition because it granted too much power to Congress).
80. See id. at 2168.
81. See id. at 2164.
82. See id. at 2169-70.
83. Id. at 2163. Although Congress's legislative reach under the Four-
teenth Amendment is thus somewhat broader than the Amendment itself, the
Supreme Court has not expressly held that Congress's power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment extends to regulating private conduct. See Jack M.
Beermann, The Supreme Court's Narrow View on Civil Rights, 1993 Sup. CT.
REV. 199, 210 n.46 (discussing Congress's Fourteenth Amendment power).
The Fourteenth Amendment itself only applies to state action. See The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court held
that Congress cannot reach private conduct when enacting laws pursuant to
the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
In United States v. Guest, however, a majority of the Court opined, in two
opinions, that Congress could prohibit private conspiracies to interfere with
Fourteenth Amendment rights. See 383 U.S. 745, 782 (1966) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also District of Columbia v.
Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424 n.8 (1973) (explaining in dictum that although the
Fourteenth Amendment itself does not regulate private conduct, Congress
may regulate such conduct under its power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment). Lower courts have come to different conclusions on the issue.
Compare Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779,
794 (W.D. Va. 1996), rev'd, 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997), ("[Ihe idea that
Congress can address purely private conduct under § 5 is contrary to both the
language of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Cases.") with
Lewis v. Pearson Found., Inc., 908 F.2d 318, 322 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
507 U.S. 908 (1993), (concluding that Congress can regulate private conduct
under the Fourteenth Amendment).
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prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a sub-
stantive change in the governing law is not easy to discern," the
Court cautioned that "[there must be a congruence and propor-
tionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the
means adopted to that end."" Under Flores, therefore, the reach
of the enforcement power depends on the prevalence of constitu-
tional violations."
H. THE PURPOSE AND OPERATION OF THE ADA
A. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PERSONS wrT DISABILITEs
In Cleburne,' the Court observed that no "continuing an-
tipathy or prejudice" exists towards persons with mental dis-
abilities, thereby obviating the need for a heightened level of
scrutiny.87 The Court also implied that physically disabled indi-
viduals are not subject to rampant prejudice.88 During hearings
on the ADA, however, numerous disabled individuals testified
about widespread discrimination and recounted personal stories
of insults, exclusion, and isolation. 9 Such discrimination in-
cluded exclusion from public schools" as well as restaurants and
other places of public accommodation.9' To justify excluding dis-
84. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2164.
85. -See id. at 2169-70. The Court explained:
Preventative measures... may be appropriate when there is reason
to believe that many of the laws affected by the congressional enact-
ment have a significant likelihood of being unconstitutional
." The appropriateness of remedial measures must be consid-
ered in light of the evil presented.... Strong measures appropriate
to address one harm may be an unwarranted response to another,
lesser one.
Id. (citations omitted). In contrast, RFRA's strict scrutiny standard was too
intrusive because the laws affected by RFRA were mostly constitutional. See
id. at 2170 (noting RFRA's intrusion "at every level of government").
86. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
87. Id. at 443.
88. By referring to physically disabled individuals as another group un-
likely to require an elevated level of scrutiny, the Court implied that disability
in general does not normally incite antipathy. See supra Part LB.2 (describing
Cleburne).
89. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11) at 29-30 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.CA.N. 303,311-12.
90. See James W. Ellis, Introduction to the 1992 Symposium on the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 22 N.M. L. REV. 7, 7 (1992).
9L See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(ED at 29-30 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.CA.N. 303,311-12.
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abled individuals, public officials and business owners often re-
ferred to safety and liability concerns' as well as the potentially
disturbing effect that the sight of a disabled person could have
on other patrons 3 Some incidents of harassment, lacking these
justifications, apparently arose out of sheer hostility.' For per-
sons with mental disabilities in particular, the extensive history
of discrimination is even more disturbing."
The isolation that stems from such exclusion continues to be
a major problem for disabled individuals.' Most persons with
disabilities are unemployed." Disabled individuals are also
92. See id.
93. See id Particularly egregious examples of such incidents include a
zookeeper excluding children with Down's Syndrome because he was con-
cerned they would agitate the animals; a college refusing to hire a severely
arthritic woman because 'college trustees [thought] normal students
shouldn't see her"'; proprietors of an auction house attempting to remove two
disabled women by force because they were 'disgusting to look at'; and a
court excluding a child with cerebral palsy from public school because, accord-
ing to his teacher, his appearance "'produced a nauseating effect" on the other
students. See iU (quoting from personal testimony at congressional hearings,
court cases, and other sources documenting incidents of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities).
94. For example, one individual told the story of a police officer pointing a
gun at his head and pretending to shoot. See Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1988: Hearing on H.R. 4498 Before the Subcomm. on Select Educ. of the
Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 100th Cong. 167 (1989) (statement of Cynthia L.
Miller). The officer apparently found it amusing that his victim could not run
away. See UdL A similar incident took place in St. Paul recently, suggesting
that such hostility is not unique. See Mary Ellen Egan, Taken for a Ride,
CITY PAGES (Minneapolis), Oct. 22, 1997, at 6 (describing an incident in which
police officers beat a quadriplegic man because he could not raise his hands
above his head).
95. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 461-
64 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(summarizing history of purposeful discrimination against individuals with
mental disabilities); ALBERT DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA 353
(2d ed. 1949) (noting that at the turn of the century "the feebleminded person
was looked upon as a parasite on the body politic who must be mercilessly
isolated or destroyed for the protection of society").
96. See Louis HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES, INC., THE ICD SURVEY OF
DISABLED AMERICANS: BRINGING DISABLED AMERICANS INTO THE MAIN.
STREAM 33-43 (1986) (discussing the effects of disability on disabled people's
social lives and activity in their communities).
97. See id. at 47 (reporting that "[tiwo-thirds of all disabled Americans
between age 16 and 64 are not working"). Of the group of disabled people not
working, two-thirds wanted to work, suggesting that access to employment is
a dominant concern for disabled individuals. See id. at 50. But see WILLIE V.
BRYAN, IN SEARCH OF FREEDOM: HOW PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES HAVE
BEEN DISENFRANCHISED FROM THE MAINSTREAM OF AMERICAN SOCIETY 42-43
(1996) (arguing that focusing exclusively on enhancing work opportunities
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poorer than the general population," socialize less often," and
tend to be less educated than people without disabilities.'"
Prejudice is not the sole cause of the disparity in wealth, educa-
tion, and social participation between disabled and nondisabled
individuals, however. In a nationwide survey, the majority of
persons with disabilities cited their disability itself as a major
limitation on their ability to work.' °' When asked to identify
barriers to greater participation in community life, persons with
disabilities most often referred to fear that their disability would
cause them to become hurt, sick, or victimized by crime.'" Thus,
while intentional discrimination is a factor, the physical limita-
tions that disability imposes also play a role in creating the dis-
crepancy in the quality of life between disabled and non-disabled
individuals. 3
B. THE AMERIcANs WnM DIsABIrims ACT
In response to the obstacles disabled individuals face in soci-
ety, Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act in
1990.' In its legislative findings set forth in the ADA, Congress
discounts the concerns of disabled individuals who will never be able to work).
98. See LOUIS HARIS AND ASSOCIATES, INC., supra note 96, at 23-24.
99. See id. at 33-43.
100. See id. at 25.
101. See id. at 70-71 (reporting that 78% of disabled individuals cited their
disability as a major limitation on their ability to work, 47% cited employers'
negative attitudes, 28% cited lack of transportation, and 23% cited lack of
equipment).
102. See id. at 63.
103. It is possible to characterize environmental barriers as a form of pur-
poseful discrimination. See CLAIRE H. LIACHOWITZ, DISABILITY AS A SOCIAL
CONSTRUCT 5 (1988) ("[D]isability is a result of the various social construc-
tions that force handicapped individuals into a position of deviance.... Con-
sequences of even minor physical impairments may thus be determined by
socially created imperatives."). But see Nihiser v. Ohio Envtl. Protection
Agency, 979 F. Supp. 1168, 1174 (S.D. Ohio 1997) ("lit is difficult to under-
stand, in light of traditional notions of what constitutes discriminatory ani-
mus, how the failure to modify a building constructed fifty years earlier can
constitute discrimination when the original builders had no intent whatsoever
of impeding the disabled from gaining access to the building.").
104. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified primarily at 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994)). Congress set forth its findings in the text of
the statute that
individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of
discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion, the discrimi-
natory effects of architectural, transportation, and communication
barriers, overprotective rules and policies, failure to make modifica-
tions to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification
standards and criteria, segregation, and relegation to lesser services,
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asserted that disabled individuals are a "discrete and insular
minority who have been... subjected to a history of purposeful
unequal treatment... based on characteristics that are beyond
the control of such individuals.""5 To eradicate this discrimina-
tion, Congress "invoke[d] the sweep of congressional authority,
including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to
regulate commerce."IM The ADA is divided into several titles
and governs a broad range of activities, including employment,'
government services,"8 public accommodations," and communi-
cations."' Title II". of the ADA covers public entities, including
states.
2
1. The Scope of the Title I's Coverage
The protections of Title H apply to every "qualified individual
with a disability.""' A disability is defined as a "physical or men-
programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or other opportunities.
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7). Based on this statutory language, some
courts and commentators have argued that the ADA overruled Cleburne. See
Martin v. Voinovich, 840 F. Supp. 1175, 1209 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (finding that
the ADA overruled Cleburne); Rains, supra note 59, at 201 (arguing that the
ADA is intended to mandate heightened scrutiny); James B. Miller, Note, The
Disabled, the ADA, and Strict Scrutiny, 6 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 393, 393 (1994)
(arguing that the ADA overturned Cleburne). But see Bartlett v. New York
State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 970 F. Supp. 1094, 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("[Alt the
very least, Boerne tells us that Congress may not, under the ADA, directly al-
ter the level of scrutiny afforded the disabled under the Equal Protection
Clause.").
106. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4).
107. See id. §§ 12111-12117.
108. See id. §§ 12131-12165.
109. See id. §§ 12181-12189.
110. See 47 U.S.C. § 225 (1994).
111. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165. For a thorough discussion of Title I,
see Anne B. Thomas, Beyond the Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 22 N.M. L. REV. 243 (1992).
112. "Public entity" includes state and local governments as well as their
departments, agencies, and other instrumentalities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131.
There is no issue as to the applicability of the ADA to local governments be-
cause they are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See supra text
accompanying note 27 (describing the limitations of the Eleventh Amend-
ment).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The ADA defines "qualified": "The term 'qualified
individual with a disability' means an individual with a disability who, with or
without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of
architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of
auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the
receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a
public entity." Id. § 12131(2).
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tal impairment that substantially limits one or more.., major life
activities of [an] individual,""4 including "functions such as car-
ing for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.""' The
definition of "disability" also includes individuals who have "a rec-
ord of... an impairmenf" ' or who are "regarded as having... an
impairment.""' 7 In addition, Title II protects nondisabled people
who associate with disabled people."' In contrast to other anti-
discrimination statutes, the breadth and complexity of this pro-
tection ensures that a significant amount of litigation will focus
on the threshold question of whether the individual bringing suit
is even a member of the protected class."9
114. Id. § 12102(2)(A). Physical and mental impairments include:
(A) Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement,
or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body sys-
tems: Neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respira-
tory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, diges-
tive, genitourinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine;
(B) Any mental or psychological disorder such as mental retardation,
organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific
learning disabilities.
28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1997). "Substantially limits" means:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in
the general population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration
under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity
as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the
average person in the general population can perform that same ma-jor life activity.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1). The regulations also list a number of factors to con-
sider in determining whether a major life activity is substantially limited: "(i)
The nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) The duration or expected du-
ration of the impairment; and (iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the
expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impair-
ment." Id. § 1630.2(j)(2).
115. 28 C.F.R..§ 35.104.
116. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B).
117. Id. § 12102(2)(C). Individuals may meet the "regarded as" disabled in
one of three ways: having an impairment that does not substantially limit a
major life activity but is treated as if it did; having an impairment that sub-
stantially limits a major life activity because of the attitudes of others; or be-
ing treated as having an impairment where no such impairment exists. See
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1) (1997).
118. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (applying to employment); 28 C.F.R. §
35.130(g) (applying to public entities).
119. See Steven S. Locke, The Incredible Shrinking Protected Class: Rede-fining the Scope of Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 68 U.
COLO. L. REV. 107, 114-15 (1997) (noting that the ADA requires a greater
threshold showing that the plaintiff is a member of the protected class than
other antidiscrimination statutes).
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2. The Requirements of Title H1
Title II protects qualified individuals with disabilities from dis-
crimination on the basis of disability.2' In addition to prohibiting
intentional exclusion, Title 11 requires public entities to operate
their programs and services in a manner readily accessible to
disabled individuals.'2' Public employers must, like private em-
ployers, provide accommodations to disabled employees and
applicants."u Individuals may enforce the provisions of Title H
through private suits.12
While Title 11 imposes its conditions on all public entities,
regardless of size,24 public entities can be excused from some of
the requirements if they can show that compliance would create
an undue financial and administrative burden," cause a funda-
mental alteration in the service,"u or destroy the historic signifi-
cance of a building.2  In the employment context, public entities
may avoid the requirements of Title IE by demonstrating that
120. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 ("Subject to the provisions of this subchapter,
no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, pro-
grams, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any
such entity."). Title H incorporates the provisions of Title I, which governs
private employers with fifteen or more employees. See 28 C.F.R. §
35.140(b)(1). For public entities with fewer than fifteen employees, Title 11
adopts the requirements of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See id. §
35.140(b)(2). As Congress has since amended section 504 to incorporate the
requirements of Title I of the ADA, there is no difference between the stan-
dards applicable to the two groups of employers. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(d)
(1994); see also Cheryl L. Anderson, Damages for Intentional Discrimination
by Public Entities Under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act: A Rose
by Any Other Name, But Are the Remedies the Same?, 9 BYU J. PUB. L. 235,
239 (1995) ("[Riegardless of whether the coverage falls under Title I, Title 11,
or section 504, employment discrimination based on disability is now governed
by Title I substantive standards.").
121. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a).
122. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9.
123. See 42 U.S.C. § 12133; see also Bonnie P. Tucker, The Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990: An Overview, 22 N.M.L. REV. 13, 63 & n.325 (1992)
(describing Title Hs enforcement scheme).
1 See supra note 112 (defining "public entity").
125. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3) (applying to the modification of existing
facilities); id. § 35.164 (applying to the procurement of communications de-
vices); 49 C.F.R. § 37.151 (1997) (applying to paratransit services).
126. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3) (applying to the modification of existing
facilities); id. § 35.164 (applying to the procurement of communications de-
vices).
127. See id. § 35.150(a)(2) (qualifying the requirement that public services
be readily accessible to disabled individuals).
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providing an accommodation would impose an undue hardship2 '
or create a direct threat to health or safety.'29 In addition, accom-
modations must be reasonable,3 ' and while employers may have
to consider the disabled individual's suggestions, 3' the final
choice is left to the employer.'
IlI. THE ADA'S ABROGATION OF STATE
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
In order to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity, the ADA must represent a valid exercise of Con-
gress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.' While
the ADA, like all congressional enactments, is presumptively
constitutional,'34 states have advanced two primary arguments
as to why it is not valid under the Fourteenth Amendment and
thus fails to abrogate state immunity. First, states assert that
the ADA in effect imposes heightened scrutiny on classifications
based on disability.'35 Because Cleburne held that mental dis-
ability, and by implication disability in general, is not a suspect
classification,'36 states argue that the Fourteenth Amendment
does not authorize Congress to legislate protections for disabled
individuals.'37 If this argument is correct, Congress cannot pro-
hibit states from intentionally discriminating against disabled
128. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(d). "Undue hardship" means "significant dif-
ficulty or expense." Id. § 1630.2(p)(1). To determine whether an accommoda-
tion imposes significant expense, courts must consider the cost of the accom-
modation and the employer's financial resources. See id. § 1630.2 (p)(2 ).
129. See id. § 1630.15(b)(2).
130. See Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543 (7th
Cir. 1995) (holding that to present a prima facie case of discrimination under
the ADA for failure to provide an accommodation, an employee "must show
that the accommodation is reasonable in the sense both of efficacious and of
proportional to costs").
131. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3).
132. See id. app. § 1630.
133. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
134. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2171-72 (1997) (noting
that the Court presumes that congressional legislation is constitutionally
valid).
135. See Autio v. Minnesota, 968 F. Supp. 1366, 1371 (D. Minn. 1997)
(describing the state's argument). By emphasizing that disability is subject to
the rational basis test, the state implied that the ADA embodies a higher level
of scrutiny than rational basis. See id.
136. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
137. SeeAutio, 968 F. Supp. at 1371.
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individuals, much less require states to accommodate them. As
applied to states, therefore, the ADA would be completely invalid.
Second, states note that the Equal Protection Clause prohib-
its states from engaging in irrational discrimination.' Where a
state treats individuals equally, the requirements of the clause
are satisfied.' Insofar as the ADA requires states to accommo-
dates disabled individuals, states argue that it bears no relation
to the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause.'" Because, under
Flores, Congress's Fourteenth Amendment power is limited to
preventing constitutional violations,' states assert that this lack
of a connection between any potential constitutional violation
and the ADA's accommodation requirement renders the require-
ment unconstitutional as applied to states.' Additionally, states
argue that the burdensome cost of accommodating disabled indi-
viduals renders the requirement invalid." Several courts have
agreed with these arguments."
While courts differ regarding the validity of the ADA's ac-
commodation provisions under the Fourteenth Amendment, they
generally agree that it is within Congress's Fourteenth Amend-
ment power to prohibit states from intentionally discriminating
against disabled individuals.45 In Brown v. North Carolina Divi-
138. See Brown v. North Carolina Div. of Motor Vehicles, No. 5:96-CV-689-
BO(1), 1997 WL 755010, at *9 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 28, 1997) (describing the Equal
Protection Clause).
139. See Nihiser v. Ohio EnvtL Protection Agency, 979 F. Supp. 1168, 1174
(S.D. Ohio 1997) (noting that the Equal Protection Clause does not require
accommodation).
140. See id.
14L See supra note 81 and accompanying text (describing City of Boerne v.
Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997)).
142. See Nihiser, 979 F. Supp. at 1176.
143. See id. at 1174.
144. See Garrett v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala., Nos. Civ_A 97-
AR-0092, Civ.A. 97-AR-2179-S, 1998 WL 21879, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 13, 1998)("Congress cannot stretch Section 5 and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to force a state to provide allegedly equal treatment
by guaranteeing special treatment or 'accommodation! for disabled persons
."); Brown v. North Carolina Div. of Motor Vehicles, No. 5:96-CV-689-
BO(1), 1997 WL 755010, at *9 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 28, 1997) (stating that "[tihe
ADA... single[s] out the disabled for special, advantageous treatment"); Ni-
hiser, 979 F. Supp. at 1174 (asserting that "[tihe accommodation provisions
will place a serious financial burden upon the states").
145. See Nihiser, 979 F. Supp. at 1173 (explaining that the ADA's prohibi-
tion of intentional discrimination against disabled individuals is an appropri-
ate exercise of Congress's Fourteenth Amendment power); Autio v. Minnesota,
968 F. Supp. 1366, 1371 (D. Minn. 1997) (explaining that disabled individuals
have a right to equal protection).
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sion of Motor Vehicles," however, the court reasoned that if the
Supreme Court has not recognized a particular classification as
either suspect or quasi-suspect, Congress cannot use its Four-
teenth Amendment power to protect members of the class.47 The
plaintiffs in Brown challenged the state's requirement that dis-
abled individuals pay an extra fee to acquire parking placards
that permit them to use disabled parking spaces." While the
court did not indicate whether it considered the state action in-
tentionally discriminatory, its reasoning suggests that the ADA
is entirely invalid as applied to states, even where it operates to
prohibit intentional discrimination against disabled individuals.
Because the Equal Protection Clause prohibits intentional
discrimination,'49 Congress's ability to prohibit intentional dis-
crimination using its enforcement power should be most secure.
If Congress lacks the power to prohibit states from intentionally
discriminating against disabled individuals, it can hardly have
the authority to require states to accommodate them. An analysis
of the validity of the ADA as an exercise of Congress's power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment must therefore begin with
an inquiry into the nature of Congress's power to prohibit inten-
tional discrimination against disabled individuals.
A. CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO PROHIBrT INTENTIONAL
DISCRIINATION UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Because Cleburne established that mental disability is not a
suspect or quasi-suspect classification,5 ' states argue that Con-
gress lacks the ability to enforce the equal protection rights of
disabled individuals. By declining to require heightened scru-
tiny of state action that treats mentally disabled individuals
unequally, Cleburne implied that all disabilities, both mental
and physical, 5 ' are normally a sound basis for distinguishing be-
tween individuals.52 Although in specific instances, as Cleburne
demonstrates, such classifications may fail the rational basis
146. No. 5:96-CV-689-BO (1), 1997 WL 755010 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 28, 1997).
147. Id. at *7.
148. Id. at *2.
149. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (quoting Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), which held that a disparate impact does not con-
stitute discrimination unless done intentionally).
150. See supra text accompanying note 56.
15L See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (noting that congressional
classifications are presumptively valid).
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test," they enjoy the presumption of validity to which legislative
classifications are customarily entitled." If, as the rational ba-
sis standard implies, classifications based on disability are gen-
erally constitutional,"5 a law that prohibits them in most circum-
stances would be disproportionately intrusive in relation to the
extent of the constitutional injury."' For that reason, such laws
would be invalid as an exercise of Congress's Fourteenth Amend-
ment power.'5
7
1. Congressional Power to Define Suspect Classes:
An Unsatisfactory Solution
Because Cleburne seems to limit Congress's ability to pro-
tect disabled individuals, some commentators argue that Con-
gress has the power to deem a classification suspect even when
the Court has declined to recognize it as such.'58 If this were the
case, Congress could overrule Cleburne and require courts to
apply a higher level of judicial scrutiny to classifications based
on disability.'59 Indeed, some courts and legal scholars believe
that this is exactly what Congress has done." Congress defined
disabled individuals in terms that echo the Supreme Coures
formula for defining suspect classifications,'6' suggesting that it
consciously sought to overturn the implication in Cleburne that
disability is not deserving of heightened scrutiny.
If the enforcement power gives Congress the ability to create
suspect classes, the ADA's abrogation of state immunity would
not be in question. This theory is a poor tool with which to de-
fend the validity of the ADA, however. In Flores, the Court in-
validated Congress's attempt to mandate strict scrutiny of laws
153. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (noting that since disability
laws involve non-suspect classes, they are presumptively valid).
156. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text (quoting City of Boerne
v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997)).
157. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing the broad expli-
cation of the enforcement power in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651
(1966)).
159. See supra notes 46-47 (describing the increased standards of review
for suspect and quasi-suspect classifications).
160. See supra note 105.
16L See supra text accompanying note 105 (quoting the ADA); supra notes
49-51 and accompanying text (describing the Court's suspect class criteria).
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that burden religious practices 62 where the Court had already
determined that a lower standard of scrutiny was sufficient."m
In so doing, the Court pointedly noted that its own precedents
interpreting the Constitution control over conflicting congres-
sional enactments.'" While the Court was concerned primarily
with the intrusive nature of RFRA and did not focus on whether
Congress may ever mandate a particular level of scrutiny, 5 at a
minimum Flores demonstrates that Congress cannot impose
strict judicial scrutiny on behavior that is generally constitu-
tional." Like RFRA, the ADA was enacted in spite of prior
Supreme Court precedent indicating that the state action at is-
sue is generally valid under the Fourteenth Amendment.67 Jus-
tifying the ADA on the basis that Congress has the power to cre-
ate suspect classes, therefore, renders it vulnerable under
Flores.'"
Because Fores calls into question Congress's power to cre-
ate suspect classifications, this explanation of Congress's power
to protect disabled individuals from state discrimination is weak
at best. But the alternative notion that Congress is confined to
legislating with respect to previously defined suspect classes'69 is
an overly restrictive view of Congress's power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment. Because the Amendment protects in-
dividuals, not groups,70 limiting Congress's power to protecting
only judicially defined suspect classes would deprive Congress of
its full enforcement power. Yet if Congress cannot create sus-
pect classes, how can it protect disabled individuals from dis-
crimination under the Fourteenth Amendment?
162. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (explaining the lower stan-
dard of scrutiny applied by the Court in Employment Division v. Smith, 496
U.S. 913 (1990)).
164. See supra note 72.
165. See supra note 85.
166. See supra note 85.
167. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 105 (quoting Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law
Examiners, 970 F. Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
169. See supra text accompanying note 147 (citing Brown v. North Caro-
lina Div. of Motor Vehicles, No. 5:96-CV-689-BO(1), 1997 WL 755010, at *1
(E.D.N.C. Nov. 28, 1997)).
170. See supra text accompanying note 38 (quoting the Fourteenth
Amendment, which prohibits states from denying equal protection to "any
person7).
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2. The Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement Clause:
Understanding the Nature of Legislative Power
To understand the scope of Congress's Fourteenth Amend-
ment power, it is essential to recognize that the Supreme Court's
practice of defining distinct suspect classifications and applying
heightened review is a judicial, not a legislative, framework.7 '
Suspect classifications are triggers that indicate the level of ju-
dicial scrutiny to apply." In the absence of a compelling reason
to scrutinize a legislative classification, courts defer to legislative
judgments.'7 This deference does not derive from the Fourteenth
Amendment, but from the Supreme Court's respect for the legis-
lature and its desire to preserve the distinction between legisla-
tive and judicial power.74
Unlike a court's power, congressional power is legislative in
nature. While the deferential nature of the rational basis test
may be necessary to prevent courts from overreaching their ju-
dicial function, such a limitation has no application to congres-
sional enactments under the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead,
Congress's role as a legislative body permits it to scrutinize
every problem it addresses as carefully as it chooses. In the con-
text of enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress is free to
assess the constitutionality of state action that would be
shielded from heightened judicial scrutiny by the application of
the rational basis test. In this respect, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment gives Congress the ability to prohibit constitutional viola-
tions directly, even where the rational basis test would hinder a
court's ability to discover a violation.
Properly understood, Congress's power to legislate under
the Fourteenth Amendment thus has little connection to the
levels of review articulated by the Supreme Court.75 Because
the Equal Protection Clause invalidates all irrational discrimi-
171 See supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing the standards of
review and quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432
(1985), that these standards were developed "absent controlling congressional
direction").
172. See supra notes 45-48.
173. See supra note 48.
174. See supra note 48.
175. The court in Martin v. Kansas came to a similar conclusion. See 978
F. Supp. 992, 995 (D. Kam 1997) ("Congress, in enacting the ADA, has pro-
vided the direction absent in Cleburne, thus making distinctions between the
judicial standards of review meaningless.").
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nation,76 disabled individuals, like anyone else, have the right to
be free from it. Cleburne's holding that irrational discrimination
against mentally disabled individuals violates the Fourteenth
Amendment simply restates, in a particular context, the essence
of the protection that the Equal Protection Clause affords all in-
dividuals. Where the rational basis test might prevent a court
from determining when such discrimination is irrational, the
ADA provides a detailed scheme for determining when it is jus-
tified. ' Indeed, the statute's complex definition of "disability"
attests to the care with which Congress crafted the ADA."
Because Congress's legislative ability to examine the ra-
tionality of state action is not limited by the rational basis test,
Cleburne presents no barrier to Congress's ability to prohibit ir-
rational discrimination based on disability. In light of the pre-
sumption of constitutionality that congressional enactments
traditionally merit,"9 the carefully balanced legislative scheme of
the ADA is entitled to judicial respect as an exercise of Con-
gress's Fourteenth Amendment power to guide courts in deter-
mining the rationality of state action that discriminates on the
basis of disability. As an appropriate exercise of Congress's
Fourteenth Amendment power, the ADA's prohibition of inten-
tional discrimination is valid as applied to states.
B. REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION
In addition to arguing that the ADA's abrogation of state
immunity is generally ineffective because Congress is without
power to enact any form of protection for disabled individuals,
states also urge that the ADA's accommodation requirement, in
particular, is invalid as applied to them.'80 Several courts have
agreed, reasoning that, under Flores, Congress cannot require
states to treat disabled individuals more favorably than other
groups.'' Courts have also identified the cost of accommodating
disabled individuals,'82 and the fact that failure to accommodate
is not by itself a constitutional violation, as reasons why the
176. See supra note 48.
177. See supra Part II.B (describing the ADA).
178. See supra notes 113-117 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
18L See supra note 144.
182. See supra notes 148-144 and accompanying text (describing cost as a
factor).
183. See supra note 139 (citing Nihiser v. Ohio Envtl. Protection Agency,
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ADA's accommodation requirement fails under Flores. A careful
application of the Flores Court's analysis to the ADA's accommo-
dation requirement, however, reveals that these and other ob-
jections are not constitutionally significant under Flores.
1. The Flores Test
The Flores Court recognized that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment enforcement power enables Congress to prohibit actions
that are not themselves unconstitutional."' To alleviate the risk
that Congress might use this power to enact general legislation
that has no connection to enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Court announced that "[t]here must be a congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied
and the means adopted to that end."' In so doing, the Court
recognized that there exists no easily identified categorical dif-
ference between legislation that prevents Fourteenth Amend-
ment violations and legislation that creates new rights not found
in the Constitution.'86 Rather, Flores imposes a balancing test
that requires a comparison between two factors: the extent of the
constitutional injury a law is meant to address and the level of
intrusion that the law imposes on states.
2. The Constitutional Injury
In Flores, the Court noted that the congressional record con-
tained little mention of state laws enacted for the purpose of dis-
criminating on religious grounds.'87 Not surprisingly, the Court
concluded that Congress was not primarily concerned about in-
tentional discrimination when it enacted RFRA2'8 Instead, the
Court determined that Congress's principal desire was to allevi-
ate the incidental burdens on religious practice that otherwise
valid laws may impose.89 Because RFRA was not a response to a
history of purposeful discrimination and did not primarily ad-
dress intentional discrimination, it lacked any connection to a
constitutional injury." Lacking such a connection, the Court
concluded that the right created by RFRA, to be free from the
979 F. Supp. 1168 (S.D. Ohio 1997)).
184. See supra text accompanying note 83.
185. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2164 (1997).
186. See supra text accompanying note 84.
187. See supra text accompanying note 82.
188. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2169.
189. See id.
190. See id. at 2170.
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application of burdensome state laws, was a new right not found
in the Constitution.9'
In contrast to RFRA, the purpose and structure of the ADA
indicate that its primary goal is to eradicate the effects of inten-
tional discrimination. The ADA includes Congress's finding that
"individuals with disabilities continually encounter various
forms of discrimination."92 The ADA's legislative history cites
numerous examples of the type of purposeful, invidious discrimi-
nation that is without rational justification."93 In addition to
prohibiting discrimination against disabled individuals, the
ADA prohibits discrimination against individuals who associate
with disabled persons,'94 as well as individuals who are regarded
as disabled,'95 measures clearly intended to eradicated inten-
tional discrimination. Most importantly, however, the ADA fo-
cuses on intentional discrimination as the central injury it is
meant to address. Because the ADA's prohibition of intentional
discrimination operates to identify and prohibit conduct in vio-
lation of equal protection,'96 its accommodation requirements are
related to the underlying constitutional injury of intentional dis-
crimination.
Because the ADA regulates private conduct as well as state
action," however, it raises an issue that was not present in Flo-
res. To apply the Flores test, it is necessary to gauge the extent
of the constitutional injury that a law is meant to address.'98 The
greater the extent of the injury, the more expansive the reach of
Congress's power.' Because the Fourteenth Amendment does
not reach private conduct,2 it could be argued that the history of
private discrimination against disabled individuals would not
191. Id.
192. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1994). Although Congress defined
"discrimination" to include "the discriminatory effects of architectural, trans-
portation, and communication barriers," Congress's definition of discrimina-
tion also includes more traditional examples of purposeful conduct such as
"outright intentional exclusion,.. . overprotective rules and policies .... [and]
segregation." Id. § 12101(5).
193. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 116-117 and accompanying text.
196. See supra Part II.A.2.
197. See supra notes 107-110 and accompanying text (identifying the scope
of the ADA's coverage).
198. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 83.
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alter the Flores balance. lores did not address this issue, how-
ever, because RFRA did not regulate private conduct.2 1
Because general societal prejudice against a particular
group makes it more likely that classifications based on that
group's status are invidious,202 a proper application of the Flores
test should include a consideration of the entire range of prac-
tices, both public and private, that contribute to the unequal
status of disabled individuals in society. If Congress's Four-
teenth Amendment enforcement power includes the ability to
regulate private conduct for the purpose of preventing constitu-
tional violations,203 Congress should be permitted to take into ac-
count the pervasiveness of private discrimination when weighing
the need for a law that controls state conduct. The extensive
history of private discrimination against disabled individuals,
therefore, further justifies the ADA's regulatory reach.
3. The Extent of the ADA's Intrusion on the States
Because the ADA is Congress's response to irrational inten-
tional discrimination against disabled individuals, an injury that
Congress can properly address using its Fourteenth Amendment
power, the next task under Flores is to gauge the extent of the
ADA's intrusion on states.' In light of the demonstrated socie-
tal bias against disabled individuals, Congress ought to have
wide latitude, under Flores, in the exercise of its enforcement
power.2 5 Nevertheless, some courts have concluded that the
ADA's accommodation requirement, as applied to states, is be-
yond the scope of Congress's authority because it mandates
"special treatment" of disabled individuals and because it may
be costly.2  An examination of these objections reveals that they
are based on a misapprehension of the scope of Congress's en-
forcement power.
201 See supra text accompanying note 74 (describing RFRA).
202. See supra text accompanying note 87 (discussing Cleburne's implica-
tion that the lack of "continuing antipathy" against mentally disabled indi-
viduals renders heightened judicial scrutiny unnecessary).
203. See supra note 83 (noting that Congress's Fourteenth Amendment
power could reach private conduct).
204. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 144.
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a. Congressional Authority to Mandate Unequal Treatment
Several courts have compared the ADA to other antidis-
crimination statutes, noting that where other laws simply forbid
unequal treatment, the ADA creates a positive entitlement to ac-
commodation."7 The courts criticize this aspect of the ADA on
two grounds. First, they reason that because the Fourteenth
Amendment does not allow individuals with disabilities to de-
mand accommodation,"' the accommodation requirement is un-
related to a constitutional injury." Second, they maintain that
requiring different treatment, rather than identical treatment,
contravenes the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause, which is
to mandate "equality of treatment."'
The first basis for criticizing the accommodation require-
ment, that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require accom-
modation, ignores the fact that Congress can legislate beyond
the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause for the purpose
of preventing constitutional injury.' For example, Title VII
prohibits employers from using tests and other selection criteria
that disproportionately affect a protected class, even when no in-
tent to discriminate exists.' Without intentional discrimina-
tion, there is no constitutional injury.' Yet Congress can still
prohibit state action that has a disparate impact because of the
danger that such action is a subterfuge for intentional discrimi-
nation. The fact that accommodations are not constitutionally
required, therefore, does not conclusively demonstrate that Con-
gress cannot require them.
Courts also criticize the accommodation requirement be-
cause it is not a measure designed to apply equally to all. As
such, they conclude that it is unrelated to the purpose of the
Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme Court's Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence makes clear, however, that the Equal
Protection Clause does not mandate absolutely equal treat-
207. See supra note 144.
208. See Brown v. North Carolina Div. of Motor Vehicles, No. 5:96-CV-689-
BO(1), 1997 WL 755010, at *9 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 28, 1997); Nihiser v. Ohio Envtl.
Protection Agency, 979 F. Supp. 1168, 1174 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
209. See Nihiser, 979 F. Supp. at 1174.
210. Id.
21L See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 42.
213. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
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ment."4 For Congress to take notice of the different needs of dis-
abled individuals is not constitutionally forbidden. In attacking
irrational discrimination against disabled individuals, Congress
should not be required to turn a blind eye to the danger that mi-
nor barriers to access could create an excuse to discriminate.2! 5
Rather than risking the possibility that some discrimination
may go unredressed, Congress chose to remove this possibility
by requiring reasonable accommodation. Because the Equal
Protection Clause does not preclude this choice, it is within Con-
gress's discretion to make it.2"
b. Imposing an Affirmative Duty to Enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment
The objection that the accommodation requirement is
"special treatment" not required by the Constitution, therefore,
is not relevant to determining whether Congress may impose it.
In choosing to compare Title VII and the ADA, however, courts
have brought a unique aspect of the accommodation requirement
into focus. Unlike Title VII, which operates to forbid actions
that are not otherwise unconstitutional, the ADA imposes af-
firmative duties that are not constitutionally required. As both
of these measures are a response to a constitutional injury, the
only possible distinction under Flores would be that prohibiting
behavior is somehow less intrusive than imposing an affirmative
duty.
Because the Fourteenth Amendment is a limitation on state
power, it is not surprising that Congress would often enforce it
by further limiting state action, rather than by requiring states
to act. On a practical level, however, both measu'es have the po-
tential to interfere significantly with a state's ability to choose
the manner in which to conduct its affairs. For example, many
accommodations cost no money,2"7 and those that do may include
such inexpensive measures as a headset to replace a telephone
receiver or a timer equipped with an indicator light.2 8 Further-
214. See supra Part I.B.1.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 101-103 (noting that physical bar-
riers to access, as well as discrimination, combine to harm disabled individu-
als).
216. See supra note 64.
217. See Tucker, supra note 123, at 25-26 (citing a survey of federal con-
tractors, which found that nearly a third of accommodations they provided
their employees required no expenditure).
218. See Tucker, supra note 123, at 25 (describing the use of such a head-
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more, accommodations such as minor modifications of equip-
ment are one-time interventions into the relationship between
the disabled individual and the state. Such accommodations will
not likely have a serious impact on anyone else, and they do not
affect the state on a policy level. In contrast, a Title VII dispa-
rate impact claim can intrude into the manner in which a state
selects all its employees,... thus having a greater potential to af-
fect a broad group of people and interfere with a state's policy
objectives. While not all accommodations will be as modest as a
headset,n ° this comparison demonstrates that it is not inherently
more invasive to require a state to act than it is to restrict a state's
ability to act. Thus Congress should be free to choose either
method in exercising its Fourteenth Amendment power.
c. The Cost of Providing Accommodations
The affirmative nature of the accommodation requirement
thus does not categorically bar Congress from implementing it
under its enforcement power. Like any other exercise of this
power, however, the accommodation requirement could poten-
tially be too intrusive in relation to the constitutional injury. As
one court noted, providing accommodations may impose a fi-
nancial burden on states,"' and most commentators opposed to
the ADA criticize its cost.'m Because RFRA did not directly im-
pose costs on states, the Flores Court had no need to consider
whether the cost of complying with legislation could render it
disproportionate to the injury. Thus, it is not clear whether fi-
nancial considerations are relevant under Flores.
There are a number of reasons why the costs of complying
with a statute should be a factor under Flores. The allocation of
dollars is an important part of state responsibility, and requiring
that they be spent in a particular way interferes with state
power. Additionally, the amount of money available to spend is
not without limit, and mandating the expenditure of funds will
necessarily have an affect on state priorities. On the other hand,
set, which cost $50, and a timer, which cost $27).
219. See supra note 42 (describing Title VIrs prohibition of disparate im-
pact discrimination).
220. See Tucker, supra note 123, at 26 (noting that nearly 40% of accom-
modations cost more than $500 per worker).
221. See supra notes 142-143 and accompanying text (discussing Nihiser v.
Ohio Envtl. Protection Agency, 979 F. Supp. 1168 (S.D. Ohio 1997)).
222. See, e.g., John J. Coleman, III & Marcel L. Debruge, A Practitioner's
Introduction to ADA Title II, 45 ALA. L. REV. 55, 55-56 (1993) (citing cases il-
lustrating the potential financial impact of the ADA).
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however, allowing the cost of compliance to affect whether a law
is constitutional raises the uncomfortable possibility that the
validity of Congress's actions could depend on circumstances
that are unknowable at the time Congress acts. For example, in
passing the ADA Congress relied on studies and testimony indi-
cating that the cost of implementing reasonable accommodations
would in most cases be quite small m If, contrary to this evi-
dence, it turns out that accommodating disabled individuals is
extremely costly, the statute could then become unconstitu-
tional. While cost is a valid concern, it is a difficult factor to take
into account when examining the constitutionality of a law un-
der Flores.
Critics who fault the ADA for imposing excessive costs, how-
ever, ignore that the ADA does not impose unlimited financial
liability. The ADA requires accommodations only to the extent
that they are reasonable n4 To be reasonable, an accommodation
must be cost-effective in relation to what the employer can af-
ford. The ADA itself thus tempers the costs it imposes on
states. This cost-benefit structure suggests a standard courts
can use in other contexts to decide whether the costs imposed by
a law render it unconstitutional under Flores. Rather than trying
to guess whether the ultimate cost of complying with a law is
disproportionate to the constitutional injury, courts can look to
the law to determine whether it includes a method for alleviat-
ing excessive cost. If the law imposes potentially overwhelming
unlimited financial liability, it would be overly intrusive in rela-
tion to the injury it is intended to remedy and thus would not be
valid under Flores. In this manner, courts can acknowledge that
the cost of compliance is an important concern while avoiding
the uncertainty and subjectivity inherent in trying to judge
whether a law imposes inordinate costs. Because the ADA al-
lows cost to be a factor in determining whether and what ac-
commodations are required, it is not excessive in relation to the
injury it is intended to prevent.
CONCLUSION
After Cleburne indicated that disability is not a suspect
class, courts and commentators analyzing the ADA have mistak-
223. See Tucker, supra note 123, at 25-26, 26 n.69 (summarizing studies
and testimony regarding the cost of accommodations).
224. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 130.
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enly focused on whether Congress could create suspect classes.
Because Congress possesses the independent ability to determine
when intentional discrimination lacks a rational basis, however,
it is not confined by the deference inherent in the rational basis
test. As an exercise of Congress's Fourteenth Amendment en-
forcement power, the ADA properly provides guidance to courts
in uncovering equal protection violations against disabled indi-
viduals.
The enforcement power enables Congress to go further than
simply prohibiting constitutional violations, however. As the
Supreme Court has noted, Congress may prohibit otherwise con-
stitutional conduct in order to prevent constitutional violations
from occurring. The existence of societal discrimination against
disabled individuals thus provides the justification for Congress
to use its enforcement power to require states to accommodate
disabled individuals. While some courts reason that the imposi-
tion of a duty to accommodate sets the ADA apart from other
antidiscrimination statutes, in practical effect this affirmative
duty need not be any more intrusive than other measures Con-
gress has the right to implement under Mores. By mandating
accommodations only to the extent that they are reasonable, the
ADA avoids the problem of disproportionality present in Mores
and is therefore a proper exercise of the Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement power. As such, the ADA's abrogation of state sov-
ereign immunity is valid and the Eleventh Amendment presents
no barrier to the ADA's enforcement against the states.
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